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The Warren Court is often characterized as progressive and vigorous in the
pursuit of its vision of just legal doctrine.1 There is another view, however, that
their decisions were typically characterized by caution and incrementalism.2 In
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School of Law. For comments and suggestions, we thank Jonathan Abel, Jean-Claude Andre, Tigran Eldred, Mark
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Mannheimer, the Honorable Tommy Miller, Chad Oldfather, John Ormonde, David Porter, Lawrence Rosenthal,
and Bob Wicoff, as well as participants in the Southwest Criminal Legal Scholarship Conference, CrimFest, and
The Warren Court’s Criminal Procedure Revolution: A 50-year Retrospective, the symposium at the McGeorge
School
of
Law
at
which
this
paper
was
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(available
online
at
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Michael Vitiello for organizing the symposium, and to Professor Joshua Dressler for being the honoree. None of
the scholars who gave comments or practitioners who shared information about practices in their jurisdictions are
responsible for either the authors’ errors or conclusions. I was counsel for the petitioner in Meggett v. Miller,
1994 WL 808048, No. 93 CIV. 7402(SS) (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1994), where Magistrate Judge Dolinger ruled that
my client was entitled to voir dire transcripts in connection with his appeal of a New York criminal conviction.
** Associate, Spertus, Landes & Umhofer LLP; Law Clerk, the Honorable S. James Otero, U.S. District
Judge, Central District of California (2018-19); J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law.
1. Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 295
(2010) (“More particularly, why were the sit-in cases, in Schmidt’s (2008) fitting phrase, “the great aberration of
the Warren Court” (3)—narrow, cautious rulings from a normally fearless and activist Court?”); Neal Devins,
Chapter 6 Group Formation and Precedent, 33 IUS Gentium 101, 108 (2013) (“There were two Warren Courts.
The 1962-1968 Terms featured, as Lucas Powe put it, ‘history’s Warren Court.’ That Court was a coherent Court
willing both to overturn precedent and to make significant doctrinal advances. The 1953–1961 Terms tell a far
different story. During that period, the Court rarely overturned precedents (doing so only 11 times) and was
sharply divided.”); see also Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining
the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 272 (1991) (discussing plurality
opinions in the Warren Court).
2. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
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cases ranging from 1955’s “all deliberate speed” enforcement decision in Brown
v. Board of Education3 to 1968’s Terry v. Ohio,4 granting constitutional sanction
to “stop and frisk,” the Court deferred to states and offered flexibility in enforcing
constitutional rights in ways that ultimately permitted widespread evasion and
discrimination. In Miranda v. Arizona5 itself, Chief Justice Warren explained at
length that the warnings mandated in the opinion were required only conditionally:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or
the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities.
Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions
of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our
decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will
handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this
effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of
our criminal laws.6
In other cases, Warren Court majorities similarly assured Congress and the states
that they could change procedures to avoid requirements that the Court embraced.7
This article examines and criticizes a particular instance of Warren Court
caution and incrementalism. As a precursor to the Warren Court’s 1963 holdings
that those who could not afford to pay were entitled to appointed counsel at trial,8
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1039–40 (1977) (“It is remarkable that decisions as far reaching as Gideon v.
Wainwright, In re Gault, Griffin v. Illinois, Brady v. Maryland, Duncan v. Louisiana, Robinson v. California,
Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v. Ohio would be announced with no remedial instrument whatsoever acting
directly, coercively or prospectively upon the persons whose behavior was purportedly controlled. . . . The
absence of a remedy acting directly upon these personnel is startling, especially if we understand state courts and
state law-enforcement officials to be the targets of this program for constitutional change.”)
3. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. Id. at 467.
7. Avery v. Midland Cty., Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968) (“This Court is aware of the immense pressures
facing units of local government, and of the greatly varying problems with which they must deal. The Constitution
does not require that a uniform straitjacket bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for
local needs and efficient in solving local problems.”); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967)
(“Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse
and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial may
also remove the basis for regarding the stage as ‘critical.’ But neither Congress nor the federal authorities have
seen fit to provide a solution.”).
8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Gideon,
Miranda, and the Downside of Incorporation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 401, 408 (2015) (discussing cases leading
to Gideon). Mr. Gideon was famously acquitted on retrial. Stephen B. Bright, The Right to Counsel in Death
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and on initial appeal,9 the Court decided Griffin v. Illinois10 in 1956. Griffin held
that indigents appealing a criminal conviction were entitled to necessary trial
transcripts at state expense.11 In a subsequent case the Court explained that
[i]n all cases the duty of the State is to provide the indigent as
adequate and effective an appellate review as that given appellants
with funds—the State must provide the indigent defendant with
means of presenting his contention to the appellate court which
are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant with
similar contentions.12
Although the precise doctrinal justification for this principle has wavered—it is
not certain whether the right rests on the due process clause, the equal protection
clause, or elements of both13— subsequent Courts have not questioned the
continuing existence of the right to an effective initial appeal, and that it includes
both counsel14 and transcripts.15
But the Warren Court qualified and conditioned Griffin in two ways. First, the
decisions seemed to assume that the defendant would be required to identify issues
in advance of the appeal, and would only receive transcripts relevant to those
specified issues.16 Put another way, the defendant would be required to identify
appellate issues without first having access to a transcript of the trial proceedings.17
Penalty and Other Criminal Cases: Neglect of the Most Fundamental Right and What We Should Do About It, 11
J. L. SOC. 1, 8 (2010).
9. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). After an appeal with counsel, the California Supreme Court
reversed the conviction. People v. Douglas, 392 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1964).
10. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
11. Id. at 19; see also Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964).
12. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963).
13. The Court has noted that its “decisions in point reflect ‘both equal protection and due process
concerns.’” Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276 (2000) (“our case law reveals
that, as a practical matter, the [Due Process and Equal Protection] Clauses largely converge to require that a
State’s procedure ‘affor[d] adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.’”) (quoting Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (plurality opinion).
14. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012) (“defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel
on appeal, even though that cannot in any way be characterized as part of the trial.”) (citing Halbert v. Michigan,
545 U.S. 605 (2005); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)).
15. Although Griffin itself was a 5-4 decision, by the time of Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1971), no Justice dissented from the general principle of entitlement to a transcript. See also, e.g., Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (noting “due process right to trial transcript on appeal”) (citing Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (plurality opinion).)).
16. Archibald Cox, for example, described Griffin as applicable to an appellant “who alleges serious
errors.” Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 91, 92 (1966).
17. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194–95 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495–96)). The court explained:
part or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane
to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
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Second, the Court made clear that a full verbatim transcript was not required
if some other means could satisfy the right to an effective appeal:
Alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are permissible
if they place before the appellate court an equivalent report of the
events at trial from which the appellant’s contentions arise. A
statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative
statement based perhaps on the trial judge’s minutes taken during
trial or on the court reporter’s untranscribed notes, or a bystander’s
bill of exceptions might all be adequate substitutes, equally as
good as a transcript.18
Hardy v. United States,19 a 1964 decision, tested the first restriction. The result
illuminated the Court’s cautious approach. Mr. Hardy requested a complete
transcript but made only conclusory allegations of error. Justice Douglas for a
majority of five held that where new counsel was appointed on appeal, under
federal statute law,20 the defendant was entitled to the entire transcript. This would
enable the defendant to search for plain error, that is, errors not objected to below,
but which nevertheless might result in reversal. On remand, with the benefit of a
full transcript, the D.C. Circuit reversed the conviction based on instructional error
occurring in a portion of the transcript initially refused,21 an event notable enough
to merit reporting in the New York Times.22
Justice Goldberg, concurring for himself, Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
unnecessarily in such circumstances. If, for instance, the points urged relate only to
the validity of the statute or the sufficiency of the indictment upon which conviction
was predicated, the transcript is irrelevant and need not be provided. If the
assignments of error go only to rulings on evidence or to its sufficiency, the
transcript provided might well be limited to the portions relevant to such
issues.
Even as to this kind of issue, however, it is unnecessary to afford a record of the
proceedings pertaining to an alleged failure of proof on a point which is irrelevant as
a matter of law to the elements of the crime for which the defendant has been
convicted.
Id.
18. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963); see Francis A. Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents
and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 152 (1957) (“Just what means a State may employ to satisfy the
requirements of ‘adequate’ appellate review for indigent defendants is not wholly clear.”).
19. Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964).
20. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit noted that in Hardy “the Court did not ‘reach a consideration of
constitutional requirements.’” Bush v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 888 F.3d 1188, 1192 n.9 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Hardy, 375 U.S. at 282). But cf. Furnishing Transcripts to Indigents, 78 HARV. L. REV. 264, 266 (1964)
(“Even though the majority opinion purports to rest on statutory grounds and the concurrence of Mr. Justice
Goldberg on the supervisory power, the Constitution seemed to lurk behind both opinions, with their stress on
fairness to defendants. . . . at least those states that allow appellate courts to notice sua sponte ‘plain’ or
‘fundamental’ error will probably be required to furnish indigents complete transcripts.”).
21. Hardy v. United States, 335 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
22. One Prisoner’s Break, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1964, at E10.
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Brennan and Stewart, urged the Court to go further:
I join the Court’s opinion which is written narrowly within the
framework of prior decisions. I concur separately, however, to
state my conviction that in the interests of justice this Court should
require, under our supervisory power, that full transcripts be
provided, without limitation, in all federal criminal cases to
defendants who cannot afford to purchase them, whenever they
seek to prosecute an appeal23 . . . As any effective appellate
advocate will attest, the most basic and fundamental tool of his
profession is the complete trial transcript, through which his
trained fingers may leaf and his trained eyes may roam in search
of an error, a lead to an error, or even a basis upon which to urge
a change in an established and hitherto accepted principle of law.
Anything short of a complete transcript is incompatible with
effective appellate advocacy.24
A full transcript should be provided in all cases, the concurrence argued, not just
in cases where new counsel was appointed on appeal. Mr. Hardy’s lawyer was
noted advocate Mozart G. Ratner; he moved to modify the opinion to remove the
restriction to “new counsel on appeal” but the Court declined.25 Accordingly, the
issue was made plain both in the concurrence and in a post-reversal motion. But
the cautious, incremental Justice Douglas was not even willing to extend the rule
under the supervisory power.
This article proposes that, based on subsequent developments in judicial
procedure and understanding of the duty of counsel, the standard Justice Goldberg
proposed to adopt as a matter of the Supreme Court’s supervisory power is actually
required by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution itself.26
First, the requirement of pre-appeal identification of issues, for both paid
appellants and those appealing as indigents, has largely disappeared. Federal and
state courts and legislatures have determined that appellate issues normally should
be raised in appellate briefs rather than in separate assignments of error, bills of
exceptions, or other filings in advance of the briefs. This development makes sense
for several reasons: efficient processing of appeals, the importance of plain error
review of errors not objected to at trial, the fallibility of memory, even among trial
lawyers, and the rise of appellate specialists who take over cases when a trial
results in conviction. Consistent with these changes, the Supreme Court has made
clear that appellate counsel’s duty is, first, to review any part of the record where

23. Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 288.
25. Hardy v. United States, 376 U.S. 936 (1964).
26. We focus primarily although not exclusively on federal practice and procedure because of variations
in state law.
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reversible error may be found, and, second, to draft and file a brief identifying
errors, not the other way around.
Second, in practice, accurate and economical alternatives to transcripts of
testimony, hearing, and argument have not materialized. To the contrary,
alternatives are virtually never used except when technical or other circumstances
make production of a verbatim transcript literally impossible. It turns out U.S.
District Judges, federal prosecutors, and defense attorneys are not eager, for
example, to settle an agreed statement of trial proceedings when a more accurate
and cheaper alternative can be had by asking the court reporter to print out a copy
of a verbatim transcript of proceedings prepared with the aid of voice recognition
software. Decades ago, it might have been conceivable that a concern for speedy
and inexpensive resolution of appeals counselled in favor of considering
substitutes for a verbatim transcript. Today, the fastest and cheapest solution for
obtaining a record on appeal is technologically aided production of a transcript.
To a significant extent, this argument is uncontroversial. Because of these
changes, the only way under prevailing appellate procedures to give an indigent an
appeal comparable to that available to a paid appellant is to provide a complete
transcript of all proceedings where reversible error might occur. Most, or perhaps
nearly all, courts agree that under the Constitution an indigent appellant is entitled
to a complete transcript in order to prepare an appellate brief.
However, there are significant exceptions. An important one exists in the
federal court system itself, where appointed counsel for indigent appellants are not
automatically afforded a complete transcript of the trial. Instead, private attorneys
appointed for appeals under the Criminal Justice Act27 can obtain a transcript by
filing Criminal Justice Act (CJA) Form 24.28 That form requires the signature of a
judicial officer in order to obtain transcripts of substantial portions of the trial,
including voir dire, prosecution and defense opening statements and closing
arguments, and jury instructions.29 Apparently, only the trial evidence is obtainable
27. Jon Wool & Clair Shubik, Good Practices for Panel Attorney Programs in the U.S. Court of Appeals,
VERA INST. OF J. (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/verareport2006_2.pdf (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (providing that “[a]ttorneys
may be reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred, including the costs of transcripts authorized by the United
States magistrate or the court.”).
28. Decentralization of Payments for Criminal Justice Act Transcripts, in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. MARCH 16 AND 17, 1982
AND SEPTEMBER 22 AND 23, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT 57 (1982),
available
at
https://books.google.com/books?id=SEfSR9IWdkC&lpg=PA57&ots=teErbAAg72&dq=Criminal%20Justice%20Act%20%22Form%2024%22%20circui
t&pg=PA57#v=onepage&q=Criminal%20Justice%20Act%20%22Form%2024%22%20circuit&f=false (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). For rates, see Federal Court Reporting Program, UNITED STATES
COURTS https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/federal-court-reporting-program (last visited Apr. 22, 2020)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
29. See Authorization and Voucher for Payment of Transcript, UNITED STATES COURTS, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cja24.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see
also Appendix A, CJA Form 24, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cja24.pdf. (on file with
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as of right pursuant to CJA Form 24. This restriction accords with a 1971
Resolution of the Judicial Conference,30 and is now incorporated in the Guide to
Judiciary Policy.31
This policy is flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Hardy, which grants persons represented by new counsel on appeal a full
transcript without a showing of need. More fundamentally, now that appellate
practice generally does not require advance demonstration of issues, and the search
for substitutes for transcripts has been abandoned, compliance with the Griffin
principle requires providing indigent appellants a complete transcript in order to
give them an effective appeal. CJA Form 24 should be revised to conform to the
decisions of the Court interpreting federal law and the Constitution itself.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRANSCRIPTS
In Griffin v. Illinois,32 the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional to deny
appeals to defendants who could not afford to purchase transcripts. Illinois law
granted transcripts at government expense only to those sentenced to death;33 it
also offered transcripts for collateral review, but only state and federal
constitutional claims were cognizable in those proceedings.34 Any indigent
appellant not on death row could challenge a criminal conviction based on a state
law claim only if they could afford to purchase a transcript. The Court could simply
have invalidated the transcript requirement, holding that an appeal could not be
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
30. Resolution of Expediting Appeals, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES HELD AT WASHINGTON D.C., MARCH 15–16, 1971, AND OCTOBER 28–29 1971, 62 (including
recommendation that “[a]ll counsel should be required to exhaust all efforts to perfect appeals without full trial
transcripts, by use of such traditional devices as preparation of an agreed statement or other summary of the
evidence”).
31. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES: COURT REPORTING, § 550.40 Transcripts, available at
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/guide_vol06.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“In the absence of prior special authorization, trial transcripts should exclude: prosecution and defense
opening statements, prosecution argument, defense argument, prosecution rebuttal, voir dire, and the jury
instructions.”).
32. Defender organizations such as Federal Defenders obtain their transcripts at their own discretion,
without having to use Form 24. See GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, DEFENDER SERVICES, Vol. 7, Pt. A: Guidelines
for Administering the CJA and Related Statutes, § 430.10(a) (“All defender organizations have general
authorization to procure transcripts, provided that total expenditures for transcripts do not exceed the funding
available in the budget object code (BOC) for transcripts.”), available at https://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/judiciary-policies/cja-guidelines/chapter-4-ss-430-transcripts-investigative-expert (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
The United States may be charged for transcripts, but, unlike all other litigants, may not be required to pre-pay
for them. 28 U.S.C. § 753(f). The Department of Justice, of course, needs no court approval to spend its funds in
connection with its statutory responsibilities, including expenditures for transcripts and other litigation expenses.
U.S. JUSTICE MANUAL 3-8.100 (operational expenses), 3-8.420 (court reporters), available at
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-3-8000-financial-management#3-8.420 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion).
33. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 14.
34. Id. at 15.
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denied entirely, and in those circumstances some sort of appeal must be allowed
without transcripts.35 However, the Court went further, concluding: “There can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as
defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.”36 The Court later
explained that Griffin’s “principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent
defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay
their own way.”37
The Warren Court explored the contours of this principle in a series of cases.
Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles,38 held that “The
conclusion of the trial judge that there was no reversible error in the trial cannot be
an adequate substitute for the right to full appellate review available to all
defendants in Washington who can afford the expense of a transcript.”39 Lane v.
Brown40 invalidated a law giving the public defender discretion as to which
appellants would be entitled to a transcript, and thus an appeal. In several cases,
the Court applied the right to transcripts to state post-conviction procedures.41 The
Warren Court applied the Griffin right to a misdemeanor conviction42 in a holding
ratified in a unanimous Burger Court decision.43 Beyond appeals, the court held
that an indigent defendant was entitled to a transcript of a preliminary hearing
where critical witnesses testified.44 On the other hand, the Burger Court made clear
that counsel need not be appointed for appeals subsequent to the first level of
appellate review.45

35. It is not clear how meaningful an appeal would be even with a transcript, because at that time there
was no constitutional right to appellate counsel, and the right to access to a law library was vestigial. Jonathan
Abel, Ineffective Assistance of Library: The Failings and the Future of Prison Law Libraries, 101 GEO. L.J. 1171,
1187 (2013) (noting that “many courts remained profoundly skeptical of prison law libraries”).
36. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. There seems to have been a majority on this point. Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“petitioners must be accorded an appeal from their conviction, either by having the
State furnish them a transcript of the proceedings in the trial court, or by any other means, of which we have not
been advised, that may be available under Illinois law, so that the errors of which they complain can effectively
be brought for review to the Illinois Supreme Court.”).
37. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196–97 (1971); see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822
(1977) (“Because we recognized that ‘adequate and effective appellate review’ is impossible without a trial
transcript or adequate substitute, we held that States must provide trial records to inmates unable to buy them.”).
38. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
39. Id. at 216.
40. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 481 (1963).
41. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969) (Douglas, J.) (new habeas petition to California
Supreme Court after denial in Superior Court); Long v. Dist. Ct. of Iowa, in & for Lee Cty., Fort Madison, Iowa,
385 U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (per curiam).
42. Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 458–60 (1969) (per curiam) (petty offense).
43. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1971).
44. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 40–41 (1967).
45. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 619 (1974) (no right to appointed counsel for discretionary appeal to
state supreme court or to U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari).
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The Court protected the right in several other ways. In Entsminger v. Iowa,46
the Court reversed based on what modern jurisprudence would term ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, when appointed counsel failed to file a transcript
that had been prepared, and therefore the state appeal was decided based on docket
entries, resulting, not surprisingly, in an affirmance. In Rinaldi v. Yeager,47 the
Court invalidated a New Jersey statute requiring unsuccessful appellants sentenced
to prison to reimburse the state for their transcripts, but not requiring repayment
from those sentenced to probation, a fine, or a suspended term. In the Caryl
Chessman case, the Court held that appellants were entitled to due process when a
state court reconstructed a defective transcript.48 The Court did not stand in the
way of applying the rule to cases long since final.49 In a remarkable dissent to a
denial of certiorari near the end of his service, Justice Douglas voted to hear an
appeal based on a challenge to a rule allowing indigents additional time to file their
transcript; preferring the poor, it appeared, might be unconstitutional
discrimination.50
Nevertheless, the Warren Court never wavered in its holdings that an appellant
was entitled only to transcripts relevant to assignments of error or points raised on
appeal, or that a state could provide an equally effective alternative in lieu of a
verbatim transcript. As explained below, both limitations are obsolete.
A. Conditioning the Right on Issue Identification
Historically in the federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) required a person
seeking leave to appeal in forma pauperis (IFP) to identify the issues to be reviewed
and demonstrate that those issues were not frivolous.51 Appeals often involved
46. 386 U.S. 748, 752 (1967).
47. 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
48. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 164 (1957) (“By no means are we to be understood as saying that
the state record has been shown to be inaccurate or incomplete. All we hold is that, consistently with procedural
due process, California’s affirmance of petitioner’s conviction upon a seriously disputed record, whose accuracy
petitioner has had no voice in determining, cannot be allowed to stand.”).
49. Patterson v. Medberry, 290 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1961) (granting relief with respect to Medberry v.
People, 108 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1940)), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 839 (1961). But see Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420,
423 (1963).
We do not say that petitioner, having had a lawyer, could be found to have waived
his rights on appeal. We only hold that a State, in applying Griffin v. Illinois to
situations where no transcript of the trial is available due to the death of the court
reporter, may without violation of the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause deny
relief to those who, at the time of the trial, had a lawyer and who presumably had his
continuing services for purposes of appeal and yet failed to pursue an appeal.
Id.
50. Hadley v. Alabama, 409 U.S. 937, 937–38 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The question petitioner
Hadley raises here and raised in the Alabama Supreme Court below, is whether by case law, a State can give more
time for filing of a transcript for a person without funds than for a person of wealth.”).
51. Gilbert v. United States, 278 F.2d 61, 62 (9th Cir. 1960) (“Section 1915 provides that the affidavit to
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protracted litigation over whether the court would grant IFP status.52 Rulings on
IFP applications were made with the assistance of appointed counsel and
piecemeal production of partial transcripts. Motions, briefing, rulings in the district
court, and, if adverse, often appeals to the court of appeals and Supreme Court
addressed not whether there was error in the trial, but the preliminary, threshold
question of whether IFP status would be granted, allowing an appeal without
payment for a transcript and other costs or printing the record.53 In 1962, the Court
noted “[d]uring the past five Terms of the Court, we have found it necessary to
vacate and remand for reconsideration 14 cases in which a Court of Appeals has
applied an erroneous standard in passing on an indigent’s application for leave to
appeal.”54 Dean Abraham Goldstein suggested that “the cost to the government in
man-hours of arguing whether the appeal should be permitted and whether the
transcript should be given to the accused probably exceeds the cost of routine
processing of the appeal.”55 It was difficult to defend the proposition that elaborate
be made in support of such an application shall, among other things, ‘state the nature of the action, defense or
appeal and affiant’s belief that he is entitled to redress.’ In order to constitute a sufficient statement of the nature
of the appeal, the affidavit must present some issue which is not plainly frivolous.”); see also Albert A. Ridge,
The Indigent Defendant: A Procedural Dilemma for the Courts, 24 F.R.D. 241 (1960); Andrew Hammond,
Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478 (2019) (discussing contemporary IFP policies in federal
court).
52. See, e.g., Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962) (“If the District Court finds the
application is not in good faith, and therefore denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the defendant may seek
identical relief from the Court of Appeals.”).
53. Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521, 522–23 (1957).
If the allegations made by petitioner and his counsel are correct then it seems quite
clear to us that his appeal cannot be characterized as frivolous. Before his allegation
of errors can be accurately evaluated, however, to ascertain if they do have any merit
he should be furnished with a transcript of the trial record—unless counsel can agree
on a statement of the relevant facts or some other means are devised to make the
minutes of the trial available to petitioner—so that he has an opportunity
to
substantiate his allegations and point out their significance and so that they can be
appraised on a dependable record.
Id.
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957).
Since here the Court of Appeals did not assign counsel to assist petitioner
in
prosecuting his application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis and since it does
not appear that the Court of Appeals assured petitioner adequate means of presenting
it with a fair basis for determining whether the District Court’s certification was
warranted, the judgment below must be vacated and the case remanded to the Court
of Appeals for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Id.
54. Coppedge, 369 U.S. at 441 n.1.
55. Abraham S. Goldstein, Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Poverty and the Administration
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litigation of procedural issues, overlapping with but preliminary to the merits, was
a useful expenditure of judicial resources.56
Identification of appellate issues as a prerequisite to IFP status is obsolete in
the federal system.57 The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure now provide that
anyone granted IFP status in the district court retains that status on appeal.58 In
addition, any defendant who has been appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice
Act, and therefore has a lawyer filing a CJA Form 24, will have already
surmounted the hurdle of IFP status, so there would be no occasion for identifying
appellate issues in a petition under § 1915.
Reformation of IFP status was part of a broader simplification movement in
direct appeals as of right. Appeals, like trial pleading, once had multiple,
overlapping, formal, expensive, and unnecessary steps. These included, before
filing an appellate brief, filing assignments of error or bills of exception previewing
the issues and facts which would appear in a brief. As one informed commentator
wrote in 1942:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and some systems modeled
upon them answer that the old, repetitive, overlapping, inelastic
tangle is fit only for the junk pile. A single, rational opportunity
for the trial court to right itself upon a particular point and a single,
rational presentation of it to the appellate court should be enough.
of Federal Criminal Justice. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 STAN. L. REV. 494, 496 (1964).
56. As Judge Frank explained, “without a transcript or the equivalent, an appellate court cannot tell whether
or not a particular poor man’s appeal has substance. Here, then, is an apparent dilemma: In order to know whether
to grant a forma pauperis appeal, which carries with it a right to a transcript supplied gratis, usually the upper
court must have before it a transcript or its equivalent.” United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir.
1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), vacated, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
57. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, Vol 7 Defender Services, Part A: Guidelines for Administering the CJA
and Related Statutes, 320.30.10(b) (“In a direct appeal in a case in which counsel is assigned under the CJA,
neither the CJA nor 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) requires the signing of a pauper’s oath or certification by the court that
the appeal is not frivolous in order to obtain a transcript.”), available at https://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/judiciary-policies/cja-guidelines/chapter-3-ss-320-authorization-investigative-expert#a320_30 (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
58. FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(3).
Prior Approval. A party who was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the
district-court action, or who was determined to be financially unable to obtain an
adequate defense in a criminal case, may proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
without further authorization, unless:
(A) the district court—before or after the notice of appeal is filed—certifies that the
appeal is not taken in good faith or finds that the party is not otherwise entitled to
proceed in forma pauperis and states in writing its reasons for the certification
or
finding; or
(B) a statute provides otherwise.
Id.
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And so exceptions are being dropped, bills of exceptions are being
supplied by the court reporter’s transcript, assignments of error
are occasionally being abolished, and the brief is being turned into
a simple, understandable argument.59
In the federal system, assignments of error as part of the notice of appeal itself
were abolished with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,60 a policy carried
forward in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.61 Of course, these reforms
applied to direct appeals as of right. In discretionary appeals, such as certiorari to
the U.S. Supreme Court,62 identification of the issues warranting review remains
essential.63
For these reasons, the observation in the Griffin line of cases that a defendant
is entitled only to those parts of the transcript associated with the specified issues
is anachronistic. In federal courts and most, though not all, other U.S.
jurisdictions,64 neither indigent or non-indigent defendants in initial, direct
criminal appeals as of right are required to identify issues in advance of filing an
appellate brief.
59. Robert W. Stayton, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 20 TEX. L. REV. 513, 514 (1942).
60. George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 237 (1947)
(“Petitions for allowance of appeal, citations and assignments of error are abolished by subdivision (a)(1), dealing
with the Notice of Appeal. The requirement of former Criminal Appeals Rule III that the notice contain ‘a succinct
statement of the grounds of appeal’ is likewise omitted.”); Lester B. Orfield, The Preliminary Draft of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 22 TEX. L. REV. 194, 204 (1944) (“assignments of error in cases governed by this
rule are abolished”).
61. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 34 F.R.D. 263, 273 (1964) (“The
petition for allowance (except for appeals governed by Rules 5 and 6), citations, assignments of error, summons
and severance—all specifically abolished by earlier modern rules (see FRCP 37(a)(1); FRCP 74 and 75(d))—are
assumed to be sufficiently obsolete as no longer to require pointed abolition.”); Statement of Issues Presented for
Review, 14 CYC. FED. PROC. § 66:16 (3d ed.) (“Assignments of error in the historical sense have, in effect, been
abolished. The principle, however, has been continued by the appellate rules and by rules provisions of the courts
of appeals requiring the brief of the appellant to contain a statement of the particular issues presented for review,
or a designation of the errors relied upon.”).
62. U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10; R. 14(1)(a).
63. Findlay v. Commonwealth, 752 S.E.2d 868, 871 (Va. 2014) (“The purpose of assignments of error is
to point out the errors with reasonable certainty in order to direct this court and opposing counsel to the points on
which [the] appellant intends to ask a reversal of the judgment, and to limit discussion to these points. Without
such assignments, [the] appellee would be unable to prepare an effective brief in opposition to the granting of an
appeal”).
64. While a full survey of state appellate practices is beyond the scope of this article, the authors believe
that only a handful of jurisdictions require pre-brief identification of issues. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. §
884 (assignments of error); N.M. RULES APP. P., Rule 12–208 (docketing statement). See also State v. Sharp,
35,714 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/02), 810 So. 2d 1179, 1194 (“Neither Sharp nor his attorney have assigned as error
any issues dealing with the jury voir dire. Sharp’s generic allegations that his counsel used all of his peremptory
challenges and his need for the transcript to prepare his assignments of error amounts to a fishing expedition and
is insufficient to require a supplementation of the record.”); State v. Ibarra, 1993-NMCA-040, ¶ 9, 864 P.2d 302,
305 (“We believe this standard leaves an appellate court free to determine the nature and extent of the trial record
necessary to fully review the issues raised in each case and require a transcript in only those cases where it would
advance appellate resolution of the issues raised.”); State v. Fernandez, 877 P.2d 44 (N.M. 1994).
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The reasons for dispensing with pre-brief identification of issues were
compelling in terms of efficiency, equality, and justice.65 Full review of trial
proceedings is also consistent with the modern Court’s understanding of the duty
of appellate counsel under the Constitution.66 In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin,67 the Court explained that an appointed “attorney’s obligations as an
advocate” require that counsel “provide his or her client precisely the services that
an affluent defendant could obtain from paid counsel—a thorough review of the
record and a discussion of the strongest arguments revealed by that review. In
searching for the strongest arguments available, the attorney must be zealous and
must resolve all doubts and ambiguous legal questions in favor of his or her
client.”68 The Court also explained that “[t]he appellate lawyer must master the
trial record, thoroughly research the law, and exercise judgment in identifying the
arguments that may be advanced on appeal.”69 Similarly, in Penson v. Ohio,70 the
Court explained that counsel had a “duty carefully to search the case for arguable
error.”71 As the Supreme Court understands the duty of appellate counsel, it is to
search the trial record for error, rather than arguing issues identified from some
other source.72
The scope of counsel’s duty under the Constitution is also shown by decisions
65. Federal and state appeals as of right serve the purpose of “error-correction.” Halbert v. Michigan, 545
U.S. 605, 617 (2005). See also Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49 (2010). Of course, a reversal
may be had only where a conviction was obtained erroneously. Imprisonment, probation, parole, and other
sentences cost money. Accordingly, there are economic and systematic reasons to have appeals decided correctly,
based on the actual underlying events at trial, in addition to considerations of fairness to individual defendants. A
recent Bureau of Justice Statistics study shows that criminal convictions were reversed, remanded or modified in
12% of criminal appeals in state courts. Nicole L. Waters et al., Criminal Appeals in State Courts, BJS BULL.
(Sept. 2015), available at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/casc.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
66. In several cases, the Court held that the right to assistance of counsel on an initial appeal, like the right
to the assistance of counsel at trial, meant effective assistance. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012)
(“defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal, even though that cannot in any way be
characterized as part of the trial.” (citing Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387
(1985)).
67. McCoy v. Court of App. Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 444 (1988).
68. Id. at 444.
69. Id. at 438–39.
70. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
71. Id. at 82; see. See also, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard
4-9.3(d) (4th ed. 2017) (“Before filing the brief, appellate counsel should ordinarily examine the docket sheet, all
transcripts, trial exhibits and record documents, not just those designated by another lawyer or the client”);
STANDARDS AND EVALUATION DESIGN FOR APPELLATE DEFENDER OFFICES I(E)(5) (NLADA) (“The public
defender shall cooperate with the courts and court reporters to ensure the prompt completion of the appropriate
record on appeal. The public defender shall not determine the merit of any case without the careful review of such
records.”).
72. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005) (“[T]he services of a lawyer will for virtually
every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits.”)
(quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985)); Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 30 (1999) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“If the district judge had fulfilled his obligation to advise the defendant of his right to appeal, and
the defendant had wanted to appeal, he would have had a lawyer to identify and develop his arguments on
appeal.”).
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evaluating Anders73 motions to withdraw after appellate defense counsel
concluded the case presents no nonfrivolous issues. Many cases deny motions for
failure of counsel to have reviewed the entire record. As one court explained:
counsel did not discharge her obligations as new, appellate
counsel prior to filing her first Anders brief. She was obligated to
review the entire transcript for plain error. She could not have
discharged this obligation because she failed to obtain the
authorization necessary to have the opening and closing
arguments and the district court’s instructions to the jury
transcribed. Her conversation with the trial attorney regarding
these proceedings did not constitute a sufficient search for plain
error. The transcripts of these proceedings are now a part of the
record, however, and counsel has represented that she has
reviewed these transcripts and finds no appealable issues. Thus,
counsel has now fulfilled her obligations.74
Many other decisions are to the same effect.75
Although arising in the context of Anders motions, where there are ultimately
found to be no issues of arguable merit, the same rationale applies even when
counsel has discovered one or more nonfrivolous issues early in the review of
whatever parts of the record happen to be available. As the Court made clear in

73. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
74. United States v. Osorio-Cadavid, 955 F.2d 686, 688 (11th Cir. 1992).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Cumming, 30 F.3d 126 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“Counsel’s previous
withdrawal motion was denied pending review of the change-of-plea and sentencing transcripts.”); United States
v. Zuluaga, 981 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1992)
This brief conclusory statement does not fulfill counsel’s obligations under Anders,
which requires that counsel conduct a ‘conscientious examination’
of
possible
grounds for appeal and submit a “brief referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal,” including references both to the record and to
potentially applicable legal authorities. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel’s
conclusory statement is inadequate under this standard. Nell v. James, 811 F.2d 100,
104 (2d Cir. 1987) (requiring Anders briefs to evidence an
independent
and
conscientious examination of the record).
Id.; United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The duties of counsel when preparing an Anders
brief are (1) to satisfy the court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,
and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous.”); United States v. Palmer, 600 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (“and when presented with an Anders motion, we are not free to assume that counsel combed the entire
record but found nothing else worth discussing.”); United States v. Clark, 944 F.2d 803, 804 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“Because counsel did not fulfill the first requirement of Anders, i.e., a ‘conscientious examination’ of the entire
record below, his request for leave to withdraw is hereby DENIED.”). In other cases, courts note that they grant
Anders motions after they “have reviewed the entire record and have found no unwaived meritorious grounds for
appeal.” United States v. Hardy, 555 F. App’x 272, 273 (4th Cir. 2014).
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McCoy, counsel’s duty is to identify the strongest issues, rather than to stop when
one or more plausible claims turns up. In Griffin and its progeny, the Court said
that indigents were entitled to the same general approach as those who can pay
their lawyers;76 no competent lawyer would stop reviewing the trial record simply
because a single nonfrivolous issue had been discovered, unless it was that rarest
of birds, an absolutely certain winner.
Consistent with the idea that the transcript provided indigent appellants is to
be used to search for error as opposed to proving up error identified through a bill
of exceptions, assignments of error or some other means, in 1976, the Supreme
Court described the right created by this line of cases as involving an
“unconditional free transcript.”77 Many decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeal
have understood Hardy to require provision of a complete trial transcript.78
While preparing this article, the authors consulted with several experts on
criminal appeals. Their descriptions of appropriate practice support complete
review of the record as part of the duty of counsel. New York attorney Stanley
Neustadter explained:
I always, and without exception, examine every single document
that is part of the record on appeal. Voir dire contains not only
rulings on juror challenges, but during lulls, will often include
binding in limine rulings on evidentiary issues likely to arise
during the trial. Jury instructions —-particularly when trial judge
denies defense requests to charge on lesser included offenses,
defenses, and missing witnesses —- provide meritorious claims
on appeal. Closing arguments by prosecutors not also provide

76. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963); Griffith v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
77. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 325 (1976).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“there can be little doubt that
the absence of a complete and accurate transcript impairs the ability of appellate counsel to protect his client’s
basic rights.”); United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[a] criminal defendant has a right
to a record on appeal which includes a complete transcript of the proceedings at trial.”); United States v. Huggins,
191 F.3d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 1999) (“A criminal defendant has a right to a meaningful appeal based on a complete
transcript.”); United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1971) (“We think Hardy required that
Bethune’s appellate counsel be furnished a complete transcript, including statements and arguments of all counsel,
prosecution and defense.”); Jackson v. Renico, 179 F. App’x 249, 252 (6th Cir. 2006) (“a new court-appointed
attorney who represents an indigent attorney on appeal (but not at trial) is entitled to the entire trial transcript at
public expense”); United States v. Carrillo, 902 F.2d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A criminal defendant has a
right to a record on appeal which includes a complete transcript of the proceedings at trial.”); United States v.
Cashwell, 950 F.2d 699, 703 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A criminal defendant has a right to a record on appeal which
includes a complete transcript of the proceedings at trial. Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); United
States v. Stefan, 784 F.2d 1093, 1102 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).”). See also, e.g., Palomino
v. State, 270 So. 3d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (“The State filed a confession of error, acknowledging that a
“defendant is entitled to a full transcript containing appealable issues.” We agree. See Robinson v. State, 262
So.3d 826, 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing inter alia Hardy, 375 U.S. 277 (1964)););)); State v. Quinn, 20180664 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/19), 275 So. 3d 360, 373–74 (“A criminal defendant has a right to a complete transcript
of the trial proceedings, particularly, whereas here, appellate counsel was not counsel at trial”) (citing Hardy, 375
U.S. 277 (1964) and State v. Robinson, 387 So.2d 1143 (La. 1980)).
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claims to reversal in and of themselves, but also because they
exploit and aggravate an erroneous ruling that is also being briefed
on the appeal, giving counsel fodder to argue the absence of
harmless error. Failure to examine these segments of the appellate
record is equivalent to surgeon who removes a liver without first
examining the scans and x-rays.79
Pace Law Professor Lissa Griffin, an experienced appellate advocate and
author of a treatise on federal criminal appeals,80 stated: “The only person who can
present a coherent view of the correctness and fairness of the lower court
proceedings is the defendant’s appellate lawyer, and that can’t be done unless the
lawyer knows everything that’s in the record.”81 Professor Mark Godsey of the
Ohio Innocence Project stated: “Jury instructions are where many key mistakes are
made that gives rise to appellate arguments. I would consider that essential. Also,
opening and closing statements are areas where prosecutors may commit
misconduct by misstating the burden of proof, etc. Any good attorney should
START off by reading the opening and closing statements, because in addition to
being areas ripe for appellate issues, they give the best summary of the case to get
you acclimated before you dive in.”82 Professor Barry Scheck agreed:
The prosecution’s theory of the case is expounded during

79. Email from Stanley Neustadter to author (Aug. 18, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
80. LISSA GRIFFIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS (2019).
81. Email from Lissa Griffin to author (Feb. 13, 2020) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
There is no question that a lawyer handling a criminal appeal must read and review
every part of the record. It’s that lawyer’s job to know everything that happened
before. The theory of the case and of the defense are best uncovered by reading
openings, closings and the instructions to the jury. At the same time, appealable
errors can occur with respect to almost any ruling and at almost any time – during
voir dire, before the day’s proceedings begin, between witnesses, during an
adjournment, in an unexpected sidebar. The same is true of prosecutorial misconduct
or overreaching. Equally important, most claims of error or misconduct require a
showing that the defendant was prejudiced, which means they must have had an
impact on the verdict. This requires an appellate lawyer to pull together a full picture
of the significance of the error in the context of the entire record: what was said by
the court at any point and the prosecutor in openings and closings, what was said by
the defense lawyer, was the error repeated or isolated, was it exacerbated by or
related to other errors, did it seem to bother the jury, how long did the jurors
deliberate, what did they ask?
Id.
82. Email from Mark Godsey to author (Aug. 9, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
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openings, closings, and, quite frequently, in voir dire. To the
extent there is any error at trial, especially undisclosed
exculpatory evidence and unreliable scientific evidence, counsel
cannot competently argue the materiality of such errors without
reviewing the opening, closing, and voir dire. In the reviews the
Innocence Project (IP) and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers (NACDL) conducted in co-operation with the
FBI and the US Department of Justice of cases involving
erroneous testimony by FBI agent examiners in microscopic hair
comparison cases and composite bullet lead analysis it was
standard practice to review the openings and closings both to
determine whether the testimony at issue was erroneous (the
prosecutor’s explanations on opening and closing are relevant in
interpreting ambiguous expert testimony) as well as materiality
reviews. Voir dire in most of those old cases was not available but
would have been reviewed. Finally, it should go without saying
that misstatements of evidence, misstatements of law, and unfair
inflammatory remarks during opening and closing can, in and of
themselves, constitute reversible error or form the basis of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim if there was no objection
and request for curative instructions. Similarly, without reviewing
the voir dire counsel cannot make a Batson challenge.83
Decisions in the federal courts suggest these experts are correct. Supreme
Court decisions make clear that reversible error can occur during any portion of
the trial. The Supreme Court has reversed for events taking place at hearings before
trial or otherwise outside the presence of the jury,84 and jury selection,85 opening
83. Email from Barry Scheck to author (Aug. 18, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
Another small datapoint: In a completely unscientific study, in connection with the drafting of this article, a
colleague who is a federal appellate defender sent an email to all federal appellate defenders through the national
“Help Desk” listserv. The email asked for information about any federal defender appeals policies or practices, if
any, which provide the following: “In appeals seeking a new trial (rather than just raising sentencing issues)
transcripts of jury selection, opening statements, closing arguments, and jury instructions are not automatically
or routinely reviewed; instead, transcripts of one or more of these parts of the trial are ordered or reviewed only
if some specific claim or potential issue is suspected. If your office has such a policy, or if you know of one,
would you please let me know?”
While several responded to report that their office practice was to order the entire transcript, none responded that
they knew of policies involving review of less than the entire transcript.
84. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1791 (2017) (denial of meaningful expert assistance);
Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014) (expert assistance); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea negotiations); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (motion to suppress);
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 82 (1976) (instruction to defendant not to talk to attorney during recess).
85. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019) (exclusion of jurors on the basis of race); Presley v.
Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010) (exclusion of public from voir dire); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986)
(questioning of jurors about bias); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38–39 (1978) (Blackmun, J. concurring) (double
jeopardy attaches when first juror is sworn; “Other interests are involved here as well: repetitive stress and anxiety
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statements,86 closing argument,87 jury instructions,88 and sentencing.89
More fundamentally, reversible error may occur at these stages even in the
absence of a motion or objection by defense counsel, making clear that the
opportunity to consult with trial counsel about the objections they raised is
insufficient. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), appeals courts may
notice plain error even if there has been no objection below. As the Court
explained, “[i]n criminal cases courts are not inclined to be as exacting with
reference to the specific character of the objection made as in civil cases. They
will, in the exercise of a sound discretion, sometimes notice error in the trial of a
criminal case, although the question was not properly raised at the trial by
objection and exception.”90 The Court itself has reversed on plain error based on
defective warrants91 and indictments,92 insufficiency of the evidence,93 the

upon the defendant; continuing embarrassment for him; and the possibility of prosecutorial overreaching in the
opening statement.”).
86. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1506 (2018) (defense counsel conceded guilt during opening);
Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 839 (2014) (prosecutor declined to open or present evidence).
87. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 297–98 (1991) (involuntary confession mentioned in closing
argument); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 287 (1986) (“In his closing argument, over defense counsel’s
objection, the prosecutor reviewed the testimony of Officer Pilifant and Detective Jolley and suggested that
respondent’s repeated refusals to answer questions without first consulting an attorney demonstrated a degree of
comprehension that was inconsistent with his claim of insanity.”); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 3 (1986)
(“After hearing closing arguments—during the course of which the prosecutor contended that petitioner would
pose disciplinary problems if sentenced to prison and would likely rape other prisoners, id., at 13–14—the jury
sentenced petitioner to death.”); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 626 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with reversal but noting that defendants objected to reference to post-Miranda silence in “both the prosecutor’s
cross-examination and his closing argument”).
88. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 523 (1995) (omission of an element); Cage v. Louisiana, 498
U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam) (improper reasonable doubt instruction), disapproved of on other grounds, Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (“the Fifth Amendment requires
that a criminal trial judge must give a “no-adverse-inference” jury instruction when requested by a defendant to
do so”); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (“Because David Sandstrom’s jury may have
interpreted the judge’s instruction as constituting either a burden-shifting presumption like that in Mullaney, or a
conclusive presumption like those in Morissette and United States Gypsum Co., and because either interpretation
would have deprived defendant of his right to the due process of law, we hold the instruction given in this case
unconstitutional.”); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (presumption of innocence).
89. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 654 (2002) (probation revocation and sentence to incarceration
where no counsel); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (bias in hearing on contempt); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,
382 U.S. 399 (1966) (imposition of costs as sentence after acquittal); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 258 (1948)
(nonpublic trial and sentence by grand jury).
90. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 194 (1909) (citing Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632,
659 (1896));); Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 299–300 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I am aware
also of the argument that . . . we should not now consider the point here involved because the Rosenbergs’ lawyers
had not originally raised it on appeal. I cannot believe, however, that if the sentence of a citizen to death is plainly
illegal, this Court would allow that citizen to be executed on the grounds that his lawyers had ‘waived’ plain error.
An illegal execution is no less illegal because a technical ground of ‘waiver’ is assigned to justify it.”).
91. Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 (1962) (per curiam).
92. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 484 (1958).
93. Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 678 (2011); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 221–22
(1905) (“While no motion or request was made that the jury be instructed to find for defendant, and although such
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composition of a court,94 the validity of a plea,95 double jeopardy,96 the Eighth
Amendment,97 jury instructions,98 and sentencing.99
Few criminal cases reach the Supreme Court, but many convictions are
reversed on plain error in direct appeals to the U.S. Courts of Appeals.100 Every

a motion is the proper method of presenting the question whether there is evidence to sustain the verdict, yet
Wiborg v. United States, 163 U. S. 632, 658 justifies us in examining the question in case a plain error has been
committed in a matter so vital to the defendant.”).
94. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 80 (2003).
95. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002) (“We hold that a silent defendant has the burden to
satisfy the plain-error rule and that a reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect
of any error on substantial rights.”).
96. United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 546 (1976). See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Double Jeopardy
Violations As “Plain Error” Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1161
(1994).1161 (1994) (arguing courts should review double jeopardy claims under the “plain error” doctrine of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)).
97. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910) (“It is admitted, as we have seen, that the questions
presented by the third and fourth assignments of error were not made in the courts below, but a consideration of
them is invoked under rule 35, which provides that this court, ‘at its option, may notice a plain error not
assigned.’”).
98. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 449 (1926); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,
527 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Court, affirming reversal, did not review decision of
Ninth Circuit to reverse instructional error removing element from jury based on plain error).
99. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1907 (2018) (“[P]lain Guidelines error that affects
a defendant’s substantial rights is precisely the type of error that ordinarily warrants relief under Rule 52(b).”);
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016); Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 277 (2013);
Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).
100. Note that the plain error standard, according to many courts of appeal, is in the nature of a defense
and is waived if not raised by the government. See United States v. Encarnacion-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581, 586 (1st Cir.
2015) (“When a party fails to raise an argument in the district court, we generally review the claim under the plain
error standard of review. See United States v. Pagán–Ferrer, 736 F.3d 573, 593 (1st Cir. 2013). However, in this
case, the government has not asked us to review Encarnación’s argument for plain error and, instead, agrees to de
novo review. When the government fails to request plain error review, we, and many of our sister circuits, review
the claim under the standard of review that is applied when the issue is properly preserved below.
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circuit has reversed based on plain errors in summation,101 jury instructions,102 and
sentencing.103 There are also plain error reversals in the Courts of Appeals for

101. United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reference to Jamaican drug dealers); United
States v. Ayala-Garcia, 574 F.3d 5, 18 n.10 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Defendants did not explicitly object at trial to the
“do your job” language. Since the defendant did not make a contemporaneous objection, we apply the demanding
plain error standard, and it is far from clear that the “do your job” language, although inappropriate, would warrant
reversal on its own. Still, we give it weight for its cumulative effect when combined with the other statements
suggesting violence.”); United States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2004) (evidentiary error coupled with
improper summation constituted plain error); United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993) (reference to
conviction of brother for same crime); United States v. Smith, 814 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 2016); United States
v. Acosta, 924 F.3d 288, 306 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 679 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1979) (evidentiary ruling and references in summation);
United States v. Alcantara-Castillo, 788 F.3d 1186, 1195 (9th Cir. 2015) (“While Alcantara timely objected to
the prosecutor’s improper rebuttal argument, and arguably timely objected to the prosecutor’s improper crossexamination, we need not decide whether to apply harmless error analysis here. Even under the more restrictive
plain error standard the combined misconduct requires reversal.”); United States v. Green, 119 F. App’x 133, 134
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Although Green failed to object at trial to the AUSA’s vouching, this prosecutorial misconduct
rises to the level of plain error. Indeed, vouching is especially problematic in cases-such as this-where the
witnesses’ credibility is crucial.”); United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1342 (10th Cir. 1979) (“Here there was
a motion for a mistrial with several objections directed to the rebuttal argument, although none specified these
particular remarks. In any event, in conformity with our recent Siviglia opinion which held such comments to be
plain error, we must hold there was prejudicial error here as well.”); United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204, 206
(10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Foster, 626 F. App’x 820 (11th Cir. 2015).
102. United States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (expansion of indictment); United States v.
Latorre-Cacho, 874 F.3d 299 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Gordon, 875 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2017)
(multiplicity); United States v. Prado, 815 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Mazza, 594 F. App’x 705, 709
(2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Angell, 588 F. App’x 161 (3d Cir. 2014) (omission of element of offense); United
States v. Coniglio, 417 F. App’x 146 (3d Cir. 2011) (elements of honest services fraud); United States v. RamirezCastillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (verdict form); United States v. Fairley, 880 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2018);
United States v. Henry, 797 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers, 474 F. App’x 463 (7th Cir. 2012)
(omission of mens rea from verdict form); United States v. Morrissey, 895 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2018); United States
v. Arias, No. 17-10191, 2019 WL 3717903 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2019) (erroneous conspiracy instruction); United
States v. Murphy, 824 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2016) (error in instruction); United States v. Scott, 747 F. App’x 728
(10th Cir. 2018) (constructive possession); United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2013) (constructive
amendment of indictment); see also United States v. Adams, 354 F. Supp. 3d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2019) (omission of
an element constituted plain error), on reconsideration, No. CR 15-44 (JEB), 2019 WL 1746387 (D.D.C. Apr. 18,
2019).
103. United States v. Head, 817 F.3d 354, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (application of sentencing guidelines);
United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2014) (criminal history calculation); United States v. CabreraRivera, 893 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2018) (supervised release conditions); United States v. Burden, 860 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.
2017) (factors life term of supervised release); United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 199 (3d Cir. 2019); United
States v. Carthorne, 878 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2017) (sentencing guidelines); United States v. Boykin, 669 F.3d 467
(4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 289 (5th Cir. 2011) (application of Sentencing
Guidelines); United States v. Borders, 489 F. App’x 858 (6th Cir. 2012) (probation condition); United States v.
Halliday, 672 F.3d 462, 475 (7th Cir. 2012) (speculation about motives of defendant); United States v. Harris,
908 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Grandison, 781 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Daniels,
760 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Courtney, 816 F.3d 681, 684 (10th Cir. 2016) (forfeiture Amount);
Deonarinesingh v. United States, 542 F. App’x 857 (11th Cir. 2013) (appellate counsel ineffective for failing to
raise sentencing issue).
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events taking place before trial,104 during voir dire,105 and opening statements.106
Impressionistically,107 plain error reversals based on events during voir dire
and opening are less common than in summation, jury instructions and at
sentencing. However, along with jury selection and opening statements, the parties
enter into stipulations,108 make binding concessions, and waive and invoke rights
in these phases of the trial.109 In addition, prospective and seated jurors are
instructed.110 Accordingly, knowledge of these parts of the trial are important to

104. See, e.g., United States v. Peoples, 698 F.3d 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2012) (additional charges at contempt
trial); United States v. Segines, 17 F.3d 847, 852 (6th Cir. 1994).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 552 F.3d 853 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[R]eading of the unredacted
indictment to the prospective juror pool, revealing defendant’s prior felony convictions for crimes of violence,
including robbery with a deadly weapon, was plain error. . . .”); United States v. Negron-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295,
306 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83, 120 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Withers, 618 F.3d
1008, 1018 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2010), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 638 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.
2011), on remand, United States v. Withers, 231 F. Supp. 3d 524, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2017); United States v. Baez,
703 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Signer, 482 F.2d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1973) (“Even though the cartoon was
not objected to by the defendant, we may notice it as a plain error affecting the substantial right of the defendant
to a fair trial.”); Leonard v. United States, 277 F.2d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 1960) (“The record is clear that the trial
judge was aware of the fact that the fair boundaries of an opening statement to the jury were being flagrantly
breached, but expected appointed counsel for appellant to object. The court then denied appellant’s motion for a
mistrial on the ground that appellant had failed to make timely objection.”); see also United States v. Kostoff,
585 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The total lack of jury instructions on mail fraud is plain error. The indictment
charged a two-pronged conspiracy, bank credit fraud and mail fraud. The indictment was given to the jury during
its deliberations. In the opening statements of counsel and throughout final arguments both sides presented the
mail fraud issue to the jury.”).
107. In comprehending the system of appeals, it would be useful to know how many appellants in criminal
cases received relief based on plain error as compared to preserved error. The authors are unaware of any such
systematic data. For existing data on appeals, see Michael Heise et. al., State Criminal Appeals Revealed, 70
VAND. L. REV. 1939, 1940 (2017); Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93
MARQUETTE L. REV. 825 (2009); Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Misdemeanor Appeals, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1933
(2019).
108. United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336, 345 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Diaz-Garcia, 26 F.
App’x 615, 616 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Shifman, 124 F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 1997).
109. United States v. Williams, 827 F.3d 1134, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“A month later, during jury
selection, the Government offered a revised plea agreement to Bowman.”); United States v. Coleman, 552 F.3d
853 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Dixon, 913 F.2d 1305, 1315 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Although the specific
information that one government witness had been granted immunity for two homicides had not been mentioned
during voir dire, any prejudicial impact on the government would probably have been negligible because
information about the grants of immunity and plea agreements had already been raised and thoroughly discussed
during voir dire.”); United States v. Presley, 349 F. App’x 22, 25 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Defendant notes that the district
court told the jury during voir dire that the use of agreements to testify in exchange for a potentially lesser sentence
is “a very common practice,” and that the prosecutor referred to this statement in his opening statement.”).
110. United States v. Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 519 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[O]]n a number of occasions during
voir dire in this case, the district court generally addressed the issues of presumption of innocence and
governmental burden.”); United States v. Saeteurn, 74 F. App’x 766, 768 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The court gave
appropriate limiting instructions, both during voir dire and at the close of the trial.”); United States v. Bates, 590
F. App’x 882, 889 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e cannot be confident that the District Court’s limiting instructions were
enough to guard against the potential for a juror’s prejudice to taint his decision to convict”); United States v.
Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 755 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he district court here gave the following admonition during voir
dire concerning the proper weight to be given law enforcement officers’ testimony vis-a-vis that of lay witnesses
. . . .”).
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understand the trial as a whole.
Many cases find impropriety but decline to reverse on plain error.111 Such
errors are nevertheless significant to evaluating an appeal, because “[u]nder the
cumulative-error doctrine, ‘an aggregation of nonreversible errors . . . can yield a
denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls for reversal.’”112 Because
several errors, harmless in themselves, can add up to grounds for reversal, there is
a tremendous advantage for an appellant to be able to scrutinize the entire trial
record.
Another important consideration is that the Supreme Court has held that the
question of whether various forms of constitutional113 and non-constitutional
error114 are harmless or warrant reversal turns on review of the entire record.
Accordingly, an appellant who has reviewed some part of the record may indeed
identify seemingly promising issues. But surely the prosecution will order missing
parts of the transcript if they are concerned that the appellant has raised potentially
reversible issues; a gap in the evidence or an exhibit admitted without foundation
may turn out, for example, to duplicate evidence admitted unobjectionably at some
other point in the trial.115 Another possibility is that some apparent defect—a
missing element or missing foundation—was stipulated to or judicially admitted

111. United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1261 (11th Cir. 2019) (reference to Jewish defendant as
“Fagin” not plain error); United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 521 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Although we note
that no curative instruction was offered sua sponte by the judge, and separately hold that the evidence supporting
one of Garcia’s aiding and abetting convictions is insufficient, the isolated remark by the prosecutor was not
serious enough to undermine Garcia’s other convictions under the plain error standard.”); United States v. Ballard,
727 F. App’x 6, 9 (2d Cir. 2018) (declining to reverse based on unobjected to comments, but reversing based on
statements as to which there was an objection); United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“Even though we agree with Necoechea that there were two instances of vouching, we do not agree that they
amount to plain error.”).
112. United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Baker,
432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821
(2006) (citation omitted)). See also, e.g., United States v. Preston, 873 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that
the “cumulative effect of multiple trial errors ‘can violate due process even where no single error . . . would
independently warrant reversal.’” (quoting Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted));
see also GRIFFIN, supra note 80, § 4:88.
113. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 n.7 (1983) (“[W]e hold that Chapman mandates
consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless.”).
114. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) (“We hold, therefore, that a defendant
who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error
under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. A
defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability
of a different result is ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding.”); Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935) (“[I]f, upon an examination of the entire record, substantial prejudice does not
appear, the error must be regarded as harmless.”).
115. United States v. Beck, 557 F.3d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Given that Schwerb’s testimony was
duplicative of, and corroborated by, the testimony of Chambers and Long, the exclusion of the proposed crossexamination had little impact on the Government’s case. Accordingly, we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion in precluding this line of impeachment. For the same reason, even if the district court had erred, its
error was harmless.”).

688

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
at some other point in the trial, which would mean there was no error at all.116
Accordingly, without a complete transcript, an appellant might only be able to
suggest possible reversible error, and could be misled into wasting time on
hopeless issues rendered harmless by unreviewed portions of the trial.117
Another development suggesting the correctness of the view that the
Constitution requires provision of a complete transcript is the rise of appellate
public defenders.118 Of course, there is a complex body of appellate law and
procedure; a distinguished Utah commission concluded that “trial and appellate
attorneys require different skills and expertise.”119 Almost 50 years ago, Jonathan
Casper writing in the Stanford Law Review noted the trend toward “further
development of specialized appeals arms” of public defender organizations.120 The
vast majority of states now have appeals specialists as part of their indigent defense
program, whether as appellate units in general public defenders offices,
freestanding appellate public defenders, separate trial and appeals panels for
appointed private counsel, or some combination.121 This is not to say that in these
116. United States v. Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]dmission of a stipulated exhibit is
not error at all, even if it would not be admissible in the absence of such a stipulation.”).
117. United States v. Brody, 705 F.3d 1277, 1280–81 (10th Cir. 2013) explains:
An appellant’s “failure to file a trial transcript precludes review of a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence.
By failing to file a copy of the trial transcript as part of the record on appeal, the appellant waives any claims
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.” United States v. Vasquez, 985 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1993).
Further, outside of the context of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, when an appellant fails to provide necessary
parts of the record from the court below, our review is limited to the incomplete record that has been provided;
and if the record provided is insufficient, this court must affirm the judgment of the court below. See United States
v. Dago, 441 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Because the evidentiary record before us is insufficient to permit
an assessment of [the appellant’s] claim, we must affirm the judgment of the district court denying the relief that
[the appellant] seeks.”); Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 912 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Where the record is insufficient to
permit review we must affirm.”) (citation omitted); see also McGinnis v. Gustafson, 978 F.2d 1199, 1201 (10th
Cir. 1992) (“[F]ailure to file the required transcript involves more than noncompliance with some useful but
nonessential procedural admonition of primarily administrative focus. It raises an effective barrier to informed,
substantive appellate review.”).
118. Chad M. Oldfather & Michael M. O’Hear, Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, and Future, 93 MARQ.
L. REV. 339, 341 (2009) (noting that “criminal appeals often involve specialized appellate lawyers on both the
prosecution and defense sides”).
119. FINAL REPORT, UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL STUDY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE REPRESENTATION OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS Appx. A at 4 (2011).
120. Jonathan D. Casper, Lawyers Before the Supreme Court: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 1957-66,
22 STAN. L. REV. 487, 509 n.41 (1970).
121. A 2017 report indicates that states with specialized appellate programs or units included Arkansas,
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. David Carroll, Right to Counsel Services in the 50 States An Indigent Defense Reference Guide
for
Policymakers,
SIXTH
AMEND.
CTR.
(Mar.
2017)
https://www.in.gov/publicdefender/files/Right%20to%20Counsel%20Services%20in%20the%2050%20States.p
df (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). In addition, appellate defenders are contemplated by
the laws of Iowa (Iowa Code § 814.11), Kansas (Kan. R. 27 Dist. Rule 12), Montana (Mont. Code § 47-1-301),
and New Mexico (N.M. Stat. § 31-15-8). Alabama authorizes but seems not to require creation of an appellate
defender office. Ala. Code § 41-4-323(d)(1). Examination of websites reveals that specialized appellate units
operate in many other states and counties, including the Appellate Division of the Alaska Public Defender Agency
https://doa.alaska.gov/pda/home.html, the Felony Appeals Team of the Pima County, Arizona, Public Defender
https://webcms.pima.gov/cms/One.aspx?portalId=169&pageId=480234, the Appellate Division of the Colorado
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states appellate specialists litigate all indigent criminal appeals; there are variations
within states and offices.122 Nevertheless, employment of specialized appellate
defense lawyers is clearly now routine, and perhaps predominant. Their
widespread employment suggests that they are helpful to clients and to appellate
courts.123 Appellate defenders cannot identify appellate issues based on their own
memories of trials which they did not attend.
Perhaps the leading contrary authority is Moore v. Wainwright124 from the
Fifth Circuit which held, on habeas, that an individual appealing a criminal
conviction was not entitled to a complete trial transcript to look for error.
According to the court:
State Public Defender http://www.coloradodefenders.us/offices/appellate-division/, the Legal Services Appellate
Unit of the Connecticut Division of Public Defender Services https://portal.ct.gov/OCPD/Legal-Services/LegalServices-Appellate-Unit, the Appellate Division of the Delaware Office of Defense Services
https://ods.delaware.gov/our-services/, the Appellate Division of the Georgia Public Defender Council
http://www.gapubdef.org/index.php/divisions/appellate-division, the Appellate Branch of the Hawaii Office of
the Public Defender http://publicdefender.hawaii.gov/contact-us/, the Post-Trial Division of the Kentucky
Department of Public Advocacy https://dpa.ky.gov/who_we_are/post_trials/Pages/default.aspx, the Louisiana
Appellate Project http://appellateproject.org/, the Appeals & Post-Conviction Review Panel of the Maine
Commission on Indigent Legal Services https://www.maine.gov/mcils/procedures/index.html, the Appellate
Division of the Maryland Public Defender http://www.opd.state.md.us/appellate, the Appeals Unit of the Public
Defender
Division
of
the
Massachusetts
Office
of
Public
Counsel
Services
https://www.publiccounsel.net/pd/appeals-unit/, the Appellate Office of the Minnesota Board of Public Defense
https://www.pubdef.state.mn.us/appellate, the Indigent Appeals Division of the Mississippi Office of the State
Public Defender http://www.ospd.ms.gov/Indigent_AppealsNOV2016.html, the Division of Appellate/PostConviction Relief of the Missouri State Public Defender https://publicdefender.mo.gov/legaldivisions/appellatepcr/, the appeals unit of the Clark County, Nevada, Public Defender
http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/public-defender/Pages/FirmProfile.aspx, the Appellate Defender Office of the
New Hampshire Public Defender https://www.nhpd.org/offices/, the Appellate Section of the New Jersey Office
of the Public Defender https://www.nj.gov/defender/structure/appellate/, the Criminal Appeals Bureau of the
Legal Aid Society of New York https://www.legalaidnyc.org/programs-projects-units/criminal-appeals-bureau/,
the Appellate Services/Legal Department of the Ohio Public Defender https://opd.ohio.gov/AppellateServices/Legal-Department, the General Appeals Division of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System
https://www.ok.gov/OIDS/Divisions/index.html#GEN, Appellate Division of the Oregon Office of Public
Defense Services https://www.oregon.gov/opds/appellate/Pages/default.aspx, the Appeals Division of the
Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) Public Defender https://www.alleghenycounty.us/public-defender/staff/deputydirector-appeals.aspx,
the
Appellate
Division
of
the
Rhode
Island
Public
Defender
http://www.ripd.org/officedivisions.html, the Appellate Division of the Harris County (Houston), Texas, Public
Defender’s Office http://harriscountypublicdefender.org/about/staff/bob-wicoff/, and the Washington Appellate
Project. http://www.washapp.org/Default.aspx.
122. David E. Patton, The Structure of Federal Public Defense: A Call for Independence, 102 CORNELL
L. REV. 335, 344 (2017).
123. A study of criminal appeals in Iowa showed that appellate defenders performed better than appointed
private counsel, which would make them attractive to clients, and similarly to privately retained counsel “except
for the appellate defenders’ dramatically lower number of procedurally and technically defective filings,” which
would be advantageous to courts. Tyler J. Buller, Public Defenders and Appointed Counsel in Criminal Appeals:
The Iowa Experience, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 183, 185 (2015). Just as appeals with lawyers as opposed to pro
se litigants make the work of appellate courts easier and more accurate, employment of appellate lawyers, as
opposed to those inexperienced in that field, also probably improved the process. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of
California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (“The requirement of representation by trained
counsel implies no disrespect for the individual inasmuch as it tends to benefit the appellant as well as the court.”).
124. Moore v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980).
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This argument is flawed because it overlooks the role in the
appellate process that Florida has mandated for the trial counsel.
Trial counsel is not permitted to withdraw from a case until
assignments of error are filed. Once assignments are filed,
pertinent portions of the transcript may be obtained at state
expense. Other appellate counsel may then handle the appeal
based on these assignments of error.125
The court explained that “[a] state is not required to furnish complete transcripts
so that defendants and their counsel may conduct ‘fishing expeditions’ to seek out
possible errors at trial.”126 Fifth Circuit and district court decisions continue to
follow Moore.127
Regrettably, Moore did not mention that it turned on law which had
changed.128 In 1978, two years before Moore was decided, the Florida Supreme
Court noted that the Florida Appellate Rules had abolished assignments of error
and, instead, issues assertedly warranting reversal were to be raised in briefs.129
Accordingly, the basis of the Moore decision, that indigent and nonindigent
appellants alike had the duty to file assignments of error in the trial court which
would limit the scope of their appeals, was obsolete on the day it was decided.130
Moore is relevant precedent only in the jurisdictions, to the extent that any continue
to exist, where assignments of error or bills of exception are still required for
indigent and nonindigents and restrict the issues cognizable on appeal, and where

125. Id. at 408–09.
126. Id. at 409 (citing Hines v. Baker, 422 F.2d 1002 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Taylor, 223 F.
Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1963)).
127. Kunkle v. Dretke, 352 F.3d 980, 985–86 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[N]or is the state required to furnish
complete transcripts so that the defendants . . . may conduct ‘fishing expeditions’ to seek out possible errors at
trial.”) (quoting Jackson v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 505, 506 (5th Cir.1982) (quoting Moore, 633 F.2d at 409)); Dussett
v. Vannoy, No. CV 16-12663, 2017 WL 9512463, at *20 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2017) (“Further, it is well settled that
the State is not “required to furnish complete transcripts so that the defendants . . . may conduct ‘fishing
expeditions’ to seek out possible errors at trial.”) (quoting Jackson v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 505, 506 (5th Cir. 1982)),
report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 16-12663, 2018 WL 2717767 (E.D. La. June 6, 2018).
128. Writing of an earlier state decision in the litigation, the Florida Court of Appeals later explained: “To
the extent that the Moore decision relied upon appellate rules which have since been superseded, it must be
considered no longer applicable to the procedure which now controls the preparation of the record for indigent
appellants.” Reed v. State, 378 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
129. Ratner v. Miami Beach First Nat. Bank, 362 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 1978) (“Our recently adopted
Appellate Rules have continued the liberalizing trend, eliminating entirely the requirement for filing assignments
of error. Fla. App. Rule 9.040(e). . . . The new rules require that alleged errors committed by the lower court be
specified as issues in the briefs. Fla. App. Rule 9.210.”).
130. In addition, the Florida courts later held that Moore, serving a life sentence, had received ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel for failure to perfect an appeal on the merits. Moore v. State, 485 So. 2d 1368 (Fla.
App. 1986). Once the transcript was prepared and an appeal argued, the conviction was affirmed, 2-1, because,
contrary to Mr. Moore’s contentions, while the transcript did not show counsel’s and defendant’s presence at a
critical stage of the trial, it did not affirmatively show their absence. Moore v. State, 504 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. App.
1987).
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such pleadings must be prepared without the aid of transcripts.
The other major contrary authority is Criminal Justice Act Form 24.
Promulgated by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts,131 its use is required by
court rules in several circuits.132 Few court decisions interpret its requirements,
although what exists suggests that complete transcripts are not automatically
granted.133 Its apparent requirement for special permission to obtain transcripts of
jury selection, openings, closings, and jury instructions is undesirable no matter
how it is applied. Some lawyers, taking the form at face value, will not seek all
parts of the transcript, to the detriment of their clients’ appeals. If in some or all
jurisdictions transcripts are automatically granted to all who request it, then
seeking permission is pointless make-work, a waste of time of lawyers and judges
all of whom are paid by the government. If, on the other hand, in some districts all
applicants, including new counsel on appeal, are required to show particularized
need, then in the cases where permission is granted based on a showing of need
the form requires unnecessary make-work. In cases where permission is denied,
there is an unlawful impediment to the appellate process in contradiction of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Hardy.
A more complicated question would be presented if trial counsel continuing as
appellate counsel were required to prove some specific need or rationale for a
complete transcript. Even in that event, a preliminary showing of merit should not
be required. Perhaps after reviewing the transcript, continuing counsel will be able
to identify their own plain errors. If so, the transcript is as useful to continuing
counsel as it would be to new counsel on appeal. On the other hand, if continuing
counsel cannot be expected to identify plain errors they failed to perceive at trial,134
131. Authorization and Voucher for Payment of Transcript, supra note 29.
132. 1st Cir. R. 10.0(c); 2d Cir. Amended CJA Plan, Part A, IX(B); 5th Cir. CJA Plan Sec. 6; 8th Cir. Int.
Op. Proc. III(H)(3); 9th Cir. R. 10-3.2(a); 11th Cir. CJA Plan, Addendum IV (f)(1).
133. United States v. Niebla, 545 F. App’x 914, 918 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Mr. Peraza contends that CJA Form
24, the form used to request trial court proceedings, is unconstitutional because it does not provide for the
automatic transcription of critical trial court proceedings. Because Mr. Peraza did not raise this constitutional
challenge in the district court, and because he does not attempt to show how he was harmed by the existence of
the CJA Form 24, we will not consider the issue on appeal.”). See also United States v. King, No. 3:06-CR-212J-33MCR, 2007 WL 4522210, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2007); United States v. Huckabee, No. 7:11-CR-107FL, 2012 WL 628807, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2012), aff’d, 510 F. App’x 258 (4th Cir. 2013).
134. The limitations of trial counsel continuing as appellate counsel are well recognized. “As many courts
and scholars have recognized, counsel cannot be expected to plead his own ineffectiveness. For this reason, . . .
the defendant [should] receive new appellate counsel as soon as the trial and sentencing are complete.” Eve
Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 706–07 (2007). The phenomenon of motivated reasoning may make it less likely that
even conscientious lawyers will be capable of recognizing their own mistakes. Tigran W. Eldred, Motivation
Matters: Guideline 10.13 and Other Mechanisms for Preventing Lawyers from Surrendering to Self-Interest in
Responding to Allegations of Ineffective Assistance in Death Penalty Cases, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473 (2013). By
contrast, new counsel “brings a fresh mind to bear on the record and who may discover errors overlooked by the
trial counsel.” Joseph Taraska, Procedural Safeguards in the Administration of Military Justice Insuring the
Effective Assistance of Defense Counsel: A Model for Civil Jurisdictions, 15 A.F. L. REV. 52, 58 (1973). The
benefits of trial counsel’s familiarity with the case can be obtained through consultation. ABA STANDARDS FOR
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then a process reasonably calculated to lead to accurate results requires
appointment of new counsel, who, under Hardy, would be entitled to a full trial
transcript. For these reasons, CJA Form 24 should be replaced by a process
allowing automatic production of the parts of a transcript where error may be found
in every criminal case in which an appeal is pursued.
B. A Transcript or A Substitute for Federal Criminal Appeals?
Notwithstanding Griffin’s broad language, the Court has denied that its cases
mean indigent appellants are automatically entitled to a complete transcript. Griffin
explained that verbatim transcripts would not necessarily be required in every case:
“The [Illinois] Supreme Court may find other means of affording adequate and
effective appellate review to indigent defendants. For example, it may be that
bystanders’ bills of exceptions or other methods of reporting trial proceedings
could be used in some cases.”135 Justice Frankfurter concurred, explaining: “It is
not for us to tell Illinois what means are open to the indigent and must be chosen.
Illinois may prescribe any means that are within the wide area of its constitutional
discretion.”136 In the unanimous Burger Court case of Mayer v. Chicago, holding
that the right to transcripts extended to misdemeanor appeals, the Court reiterated
that “[a]lternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are permissible if they
place before the appellate court an equivalent report of the events at trial from
which the appellant’s contentions arise. A statement of facts agreed to by both
sides, a full narrative statement based perhaps on the trial judge’s minutes taken
during trial or on the court reporter’s untranscribed notes, or a bystander’s bill of
exceptions might all be adequate substitutes, equally as good as a transcript.”137
Chief Justice Burger concurred in Mayer, but added that he was concerned
about the practice of appellants seeking full transcripts for criminal appeals. His
concern was not cost; “[a]n affluent society ought not be miserly in support of
justice, for economy is not an objective of the system; the real vice is the resulting
delay in securing transcripts and hence determining the appeal.”138 Concern about

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-9.2(a) (4th ed. 2017) (“Appellate defense counsel should seek
the cooperation of the client’s trial counsel in the evaluation of potential appellate issues. A client’s trial counsel
should provide such assistance as is possible, including promptly providing the file of the case to appellate
counsel.”). See also Charles B. Blackmar, Representing Death-Sentence Appellants, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
275, 279 (2003) (“A lawyer may hesitate to argue for plain-error review on points which were not raised before
the trial court, and may be harassed by the appellate judges if unpreserved points are argued. I suggest, then, that
at the very minimum, another lawyer be assigned to assist in the appeal by studying the record in depth and
consulting with trial counsel. If a decision is made to have new counsel on appeal, the trial counsel should likewise
be available for consultation.”); Dennis Owens, New Counsel on Appeal?, 15 LITIG. 1 (1989).
135. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). See also Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms
& Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (“We do not hold that a State must furnish a transcript in every case involving
an indigent defendant.”).
136. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
137. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1971).
138. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 201 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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delay may explain why, in 1971, the same year as Mayer, the Judicial Conference,
headed by Chief Justice Burger, urged the use of agreed statements for federal
criminal appeals in lieu of verbatim transcripts.139
The U.S. Code requires recording of all federal criminal proceedings.140
Alternative methods of developing the record are not employed in the absence of
unusual circumstances such as a lost transcript or unrecorded hearing141 or a
stipulated reversal.142 Mayer was decided in 1971. A search in the Westlaw Briefs
and Cases databases reveal precisely zero instances since 1970 in which a
bystander’s bill of exceptions has been the basis for a criminal appeal in any federal
court.143 Another alternative mentioned in Mayer, preparation of a narrative
statement based on the trial judge’s minutes, seems not to have captured the
imaginations of U.S. District Judges; it is not clear why a judge would engage in
“the laborious task of obtaining the needed information without a transcript when
one is easily accessible.”144 Research has found only one appeal based an agreed
139. See Resolution of Expediting Appeals, supra note 30.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) provides:
Each session of the court and every other proceeding designated by rule or order of the court or by one of the
judges shall be recorded verbatim by shorthand, mechanical means, electronic sound recording, or any other
method, subject to regulations promulgated by the Judicial Conference and subject to the discretion and approval
of the judge. The regulations promulgated pursuant to the preceding sentence shall prescribe the types of
electronic sound recording or other means which may be used. Proceedings to be recorded under this section
include (1) all proceedings in criminal cases had in open court; (2) all proceedings in other cases had in open
court unless the parties with the approval of the judge shall agree specifically to the contrary; and (3) such other
proceedings as a judge of the court may direct or as may be required by rule or order of court as may be requested
by any party to the proceeding.
141. United States v. Moises Rivera, Defendant-Appellant., 2003 WL 23300814 (C.A.9), 20 n.5, United
States v. Rivera, 137 F. App’x 994 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Along with this brief, counsel has filed a notice to the Court
of her intention to submit an agreed statement, pursuant to FRAP 10(d), setting out what transpired at the
[unrecorded] instruction settlement conference which took place on the afternoon of October 7, 2002.”).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Orlando, 823 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 2016) (discussing earlier reversal
based on joint motion of the parties). However, there is great risk to an appellant in relying on an agreement with
the government, because the appellate court, “of course, is not bound to accept the Government’s concession that
the courts below erred on a question of law.” Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87 (1953).
143. The state court cases involving bystander’s bills apparently exclusively involve how such bills were
not used, or were improperly prepared, and therefore could not be considered as part of the appellate record. See,
e.g., Goodrich v. State, 671 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App. 1984) (“Appellant made a purported bystander’s bill of
exception to support his contention. However, appellant failed to lay the proper predicate for a bystander’s bill.”);
Sutton v. State, 580 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Ark. 1979) (“Also, a bystander’s bill of exceptions is a method to properly
make a record where none exists. That method was not utilized. See Graham v. State, 572 S.W.2d 385 (Ark.
1978).”).
144. United States v. Sevilla, 174 F.2d 879, 880 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J.). Judge Frank explained the
process; where a transcript cannot be purchased it is the lawyer’s duty to present to the district judge a statement
of the evidence and of the events at the trial, ‘made up from the best sources available,’ in the manner stated by
the Supreme Court in Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192, 198 (1942). It ‘will then become the duty of the
district judge to assist in amplifying, correcting, and perfecting’ that statement from ‘the best sources available’
to him. He may, to that end, interrogate the witnesses, the counsel who appeared at the trial for the government
and for the defendant, and any other persons having reliable information. Among such persons are the court
reporters who took stenographic notes of the testimony and remarks at the trial; the judge may properly require
them to read their notes to him.
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statement of the case in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
10(d); in that case, a transcript was ultimately produced anyway.145 Attorneys
experienced in federal criminal appeals in a number of circuits have been
consulted, and they report that an agreed-statement appeal is not used when a
transcript is available.146 In any event, even if some other method were used, a
transcript would still normally be prepared. As the Supreme Court explained in
1942, “[i]t has become the usual, because the more convenient, method to prepare
a bill of exceptions by the use of a stenographic transcript of the evidence.”147
CJA Form 24 itself suggests the superiority of a transcript; it nowhere suggests
use of alternative methods of reporting the events at trial. The federal system’s
preference for transcripts is unsurprising. A transcript is more precise, complete,
and efficient than the other forms of creating a trial record. Often, the validity of a
question, the weight of an answer, or the accuracy of a jury instruction will turn on
the exact language used.148 It is not clear why any party would voluntarily elect a
paraphrase if they believed their trial record to be strong, or why a court of appeals,
striving to decide cases correctly, would forego an opportunity for the best
available information in favor of a rough substitute.
Of course, a different question is presented when a transcript is unavailable

Id. at 879–80. Or, the judge could simply order the transcript.
145. Brief for the United States in Smith v. United States of America, 1976 WL 194409 (U.S.), 5 n.1, 431
U.S. 291 (1976) (“Our statement of the facts relies principally upon the agreed statement of the record on appeal
filed in the court of appeals under Rule 10(d), Fed. R. App. P., which lists by number (identified at App. 13-16)
the exhibits relating to the mailings. We are also lodging with the Court a copy of the trial transcript which has
subsequently become available.”); see also Rivers v. Lucas, 477 F.2d 199, 200 (6th Cir.) (collateral review;
“Pursuant to Rule 10(d), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the parties filed the following agreed statement
of the case”), vacated, 414 U.S. 896 (1973), and overruled by Hawk v. Berkemer, 610 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1979).
146. The reason for this is obvious. If an honest and diligent prosecutor or defense attorney believed that
an agreed statement would result in an adverse ruling, they would fight tooth and nail to obtain a verbatim
transcript where some way to avoid that loss might be found. This is inevitable artifact of the adversary system.
United States v. Mageno, 762 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2014), opinion vacated on reh’g, 786 F.3d 768, 770 (9th Cir.
2015) (recalling mandate reversing conviction based on accurate transcript presented by government on rehearing;
the government independently decided to order and pay for the entire transcript).
147. Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192, 198–99 (1942). Many state cases make clear that an appellant
uses the transcript to prepare a bill of exceptions. See, e.g., Territory v. Duvauchelle, 28 Haw. 188, 191 (1925)
(“In Weinzheimer v. Kahaulelio, 23 Haw. 374, the defendants were granted ‘20 days after the preparation and
filing with the clerk of this court, by the official stenographer of this court, of the transcript of evidence adduced
at the hearing of said cause, within which to prepare and present to this court their bill of exceptions.’”); State v.
Johnson, 237 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. 1970) (“Herein, the proceedings were reported. It was therefore incumbent
upon the trial judge to order that the testimony taken during the trial of this prosecution be transcribed as required
by law. It was then incumbent upon him to see that his court reporter deliver same to the Clerk of the Criminal
District Court as required by law. It follows that defense counsel was then to be furnished the transcript of the
testimony or those portions thereof necessary for the perfection of his bills of exceptions.”); Ferber v. Leise, 151
N.W. 307, 309 (Neb. 1915) (“It is apparent from the petition that the plaintiff was not at fault, and that her failure
to present the bill of exceptions within the time limited was due wholly to the inability of the official stenographic
reporter to prepare the transcript of the evidence.”).
148. United States v. Jonas, 540 F.2d 566, 572–73 (7th Cir. 1976) (“[I]f the defense attorney had the
transcript present to make an exact evaluation of the inconsistent testimony, his method of cross-examination may
have been quite different.”).
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because of, for example, failure of technology or death of a court reporter.149 As
the Maryland Court of Appeals explained:
It is one thing to discriminate against the indigent by not providing
the tools available to paying defendants or to thwart basic notions
of fairness by failing to require the presence of a court reporter or
stenographer per Rule 1224. It is quite another to provide the
means to preserve the record of trial to all defendants fairly and
equally and then to have those means prove defective through no
fault of the prosecution.150
In 1971, concern about delay or cost might have been a reason to consider
avoiding preparation of transcripts.151 However, technology now allows real time
digital recording and transcription, with or without a court reporter.152 Using
judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys to perform trial summarization tasks that
can be done better, faster, and more cheaply by a computer program makes little

149. State v. McFarland, 287 N.W.2d 162, 162 (Iowa 1980) (noting that “[t]he reporter became ill and was
unable to prepare the transcript before his death. Since he was a shorthand reporter, no one else was able to
transcribe his notes.”); Watts v. State, 717 So. 2d 314, 316 (Miss. 1998) (“Ruth Bell–Green was the official court
reporter responsible for preparing the record of the trial in this cause. However, because of a physical disability,
Bell–Green retired and was unable to complete the record in this cause. Another reporter, LaLisa Ledlow
Linemann, was assigned to complete the record for appeal but was unable to decipher Bell–Green’s shorthand
notes and was forced to rely on cassette tapes to complete the record. However, the cassette tapes were incomplete,
and therefore, portions of the trial were unable to be transcribed.”).
150. Smith v. State, 433 A.2d 1143, 1147 (Md. 1981). Inability to reconstruct the transcript of a missing
proceeding may require a new trial. Johnson v. State, 805 S.E.2d 890, 897–98 (Ga. 2017) (“Johnson asserts that
there may have been errors made by the trial court or his trial counsel during the trial, but that without an adequate
transcript he has no way of knowing. We agree.”); see also Catherine T. Struve, Alternatives to a Transcript, 16A
FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3956.3 (5th ed.) (explaining when Rule 10(c) is an option, including in cases of
reporting technology failure).
151. Ernest H. Short & Walter G. Leight, A Study of Court Reporting Systems, 12 JURIMETRICS J. 211, 212
(1972) (“Difficulty in obtaining enough qualified reporters has been increasing; long delays have been
experienced, due in part to backlogs in transcript production; and the costs of producing transcripts have risen
considerably.”).
152. BRIAN A. JACKSON ET AL., FOSTERING INNOVATION IN THE U.S. COURT SYSTEM: IDENTIFYING HIGHPRIORITY TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER NEEDS FOR IMPROVING COURT OPERATIONS AND OUTCOMES 28-29 (RAND
2016); Greg Downey, Constructing “Computer-Compatible” Stenographers: The Transition to Real-Time
Transcription in Courtroom Reporting, 47 TECH. & CULTURE 1, 3 (2006). Court reporters’ fees have been
criticized by some. Emma Copley Eisenberg, Public Record, Astronomical Price, SLATE (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/03/outrageous-trial-transcript-fees-are-bad-for-defendants-journalistsand-democracy.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Without fully exploring the contours
of that issue, we observe that if the government, perhaps assuming that most consumers of transcripts are wealthy
litigants, has for its own reasons chosen to compensate reporters through fees dramatically above market and cost,
that should not be a reason to impair the rights of indigent litigants. See also Cassandra Caldarella, 10 Reasons I
love my Career as a Court reporter, THEJCR.COM (Com July 16, 2018), https://www.thejcr.com/2018/07/16/10reasons-love-career-court-reporter/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Once we report a
matter, we can continue to get paid for the work for months and years after it’s done. It’s analogous to earning
royalties from intellectual property such as books and patents.”).
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sense.
For the most part, courts do not deny transcripts on the ground that an
alternative was available. However, there are notable exceptions. In a capital case
involving a defendant who has since been executed, the court found denial of a
transcript of earlier witness testimony not to be reversible error when the
defendant’s lawyers purchased portions of the transcript out of their own
pockets.153 In another case, denial of transcripts was excused because, among other
reasons, the fact that new counsel had the opportunity to “consult with the lawyers
and persons present during the Rankin County trial.”154
II. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the Warren Court’s initial caution, for good reason, the
contemporary legal system neither requires pre-appeal identification of issues nor
seeks substitutes for verbatim transcripts of trials. Accordingly, there is no longer
a reason for the qualifications of the right identified in the Griffin line. And, the
Court has offered no indication that it intends to offer indigent appellants “a
watered-down version of constitutional rights”155 in the context of an initial appeal
as of right. Given the social utility of accurate appellate decisions and considered
development of the law, and the substantial investment in government-paid
prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges in a criminal appeal, there is little
evidence that the Supreme Court is interested in revising the Griffin line to offer
indigent appellants something less than an ordinary appellate review.
If Griffin and McCoy correctly describe the scope of an indigent’s rights and
counsel’s duty in in an initial appeal of a criminal conviction, the persistence of
CJA Form 24 and the lack of litigation over it become somewhat mysterious. A
possible explanation is the following. In some districts, the requirement of a
judicial signature may be a formality, every request is granted. In districts where
particularized justification is required, conscientious attorneys may investigate to
come up with a plausible justification for preparation of a complete transcript.
Other attorneys may make creative, universally true claims of need which are not
based on specific facts about the case but are nevertheless sufficient to get a
signature. If a court then denies access to a transcript, a dedicated attorney might
pay for a transcript out of her own pocket rather than prepare an appeal without
compliance with professional standards. All of these have in common creation of
delay and a waste of government funds.
Another group of attorneys might take CJA Form 24 seriously, and not
investigate at all, or stop after consulting with trial counsel and client. It may be
that lawyers who are not conscientious enough to find a way to get a complete
transcript or make a request for a transcript might also not be adversarial enough
153. Ex parte Lindsey, 456 So. 2d 393, 394 (Ala. 1984).
154. Fisher v. State, 532 So. 2d 992, 999 (Miss. 1988).
155. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
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to raise the lack of a transcript as an issue on appeal. They might erroneously
assume that because CJA Form 24 requires articulation of a reason for obtaining a
complete transcript, it is constitutional to require articulation of a reason for
obtaining a complete transcript.
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Hardy v. United States drew the right
balance, and anticipated the Supreme Court’s description of counsel’s duty under
the Constitution in McCoy. Court rules and practices, for good reason, generally
do not require advance identification of issues or showing of merit. Equivalent
alternatives to transcripts generally do not exist, or are more expensive and less
efficient. Accordingly, in this context, transcripts are ideal. Fair to appellants, more
accurate for the legal system, and cheaper for the taxpayers, under Griffin, indigent
appellants should be allowed complete trial transcripts in all criminal appeals of
right.
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Appendix A
CJA Form 24 (Revised March 2018)
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cja24.pdf
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